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Restorative Justice in Theory:
Addressing the Shortcomings of Retributive Justice and
Undermining the Rights-Based Critique of Restorative Justice
Adam Hunsberger
Abstract
In the following pages, restorative justice is discussed in both
theoretical and practical terms. The difficulties inherent to defining
restorative justice are discussed and the United Nations’ definition is
accepted for the following analysis. A rights-based criticism of
restorative justice is outlined and revealed as a weak counterargument
when considered. The value of several restorative justice processes,
namely truth commissions and family/community circles, are
demonstrated to be useful forms of creating justice and improving
communal relationships after an offense. Ultimately, restorative
justice processes are revealed as having the potential to contribute to
Western justice systems and to remedy the shortcomings of
retributive justice.
Forgiveness…is an act that joins moral truth, forbearance,
empathy, and commitment to repair a fractured human
relation. Such a combination calls for a collective turning
from the past that neither ignores past evil nor excuses it, that
neither overlooks justice nor reduces justice to revenge, that
insists on the humanity of enemies even in their commission
of dehumanizing deeds, and that values the justice that
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restores political community above the justice that destroys
it.1
The above quotation was taken from Donald Shriver’s An Ethic for
Enemies. In the opinion of this essay’s author, Shriver’s words, though
speaking specifically of forgiveness of one’s enemies, appropriately
establish the lens through which the following analysis of restorative
justice theory should be viewed—despite the fact that forgiveness
itself is not necessarily a goal of restorative justice. Present in the
above quotation are various themes and values inherent to any
restorative justice process: truth, forbearance, responsibility, respect
for all involved, and the necessity of a collective will to restore, to the
extent possible, the relationships harmed by an offense—committed
by an individual against another individual or group of individuals—
to a mutually amicable status.
In North America and much of the Western World, the
manner in which our institutions establish justice is characteristically
retributive. They are offender-focused. They view crimes as
violations of state law, rather than as against victims. Justice is
exacted punitively: a sentence is forced upon a defender that is
intended to punish the offender, rather than to right the wrongs
created by the offense. However, as A. Verne McArthur argues in his
book, Coming Out Cold: Community Reentry from a State Reformatory, in
which he focuses on the shortcomings of reform efforts in a
retributive justice system, crime and delinquency are symptomatic of
greater societal failures and disorganization at a community level as
well as at an individual level.2 He writes that justice must be
reorganized as a means to an end—that end being the building or
rebuilding of relationships between offender, victim, and their
community. Restorative justice, and the principles and values by
which it is guided, exists as a theoretical, and indeed practical, means
of addressing the shortcomings of a retributive justice system.
1

Trudy Govier, Forgiveness and Revenge (London: Routledge, 2002), 80.
A. Verne McArthur, Coming Out Cold: Community Reentry from a State Reformatory
(Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1974), 3.
2
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In the following pages, I discuss restorative justice in both
theoretical and practical contexts. I begin by defining restorative
justice and outlining the principles and values by which it is guided,
and the objectives that it aims to achieve. I demonstrate that
restorative justice is far from a novel idea, but rather has been present
for some time in many indigenous cultures around the world.
Restorative justice will be discussed in comparison to retributive
justice, in order to reveal both its strengths and weaknesses as a
model for justice in a modern setting. Ultimately, it will be argued
that restorative justice, as it aims to establish or reestablish harmony
following a situation where an offense, minor or major, is given,
exists as an appropriate framework for addressing the shortcomings
of retributive justice models. Processes and mechanisms of
restorative justice, and specific cases in which they were used, are
discussed in order to demonstrate that restorative justice is a valuable
and practical model for justice.
We must begin by determining a definition of restorative
justice. Howard Zehr notes that a consensus has yet to be reached
regarding such a definition, even among scholars whose primary field
of research is restorative justice.3 Further, Amy Levad argues that
three problems arise in any attempt to define restorative justice. First,
the programs, to be discussed in greater detail below, which can be
encompassed by the label of restorative justice are extensive and
diverse, making the definitional process more complex. Second, the
development of these programs in North America, especially the
United States, has occurred in tandem with a rise in punitive
approaches to sentencing. This has forced restorative programs to
adopt more punitive elements, and, therefore, has contributed to a
distortion of what truly constitutes restorative justice. Last,
restorative justice has been popularized in recent decades alongside
other reformative efforts. Transformative justice, for example, also
seeks to reform the current retributive model. Levad argues that this
competition between different models of justice, which possess
3 Howard Zehr, The Little Book of Restorative Justice (Intercourse, PA: Good Books,
2002), 36.
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similar elements—each seek to correct underlying inequalities in
society—has led many to view them as identical or overlapping. This,
too, hinders the consensus-building process concerning a definition
of restorative justice.4
In order to overcome this hindrance, it is useful to define
restorative justice in theoretical terms, with consultation of multiple
sources. For the purpose of this essay, such a definition must, at the
least, outline the parties involved in restorative justice processes,
consider the values upon which restorative justice is based, and also
go beyond what restorative justice is to describe what restorative
justice is not. The definition of restorative justice utilized in this essay
will, therefore, be defined both positively and negatively.
Levad is critical of the following definition, offered by Zehr:
“a process to involve, to the extent possible, those who have a stake
in a specific offense and to collectively identify and address harms,
needs, and obligations, in order to heal and put things as right as
possible.”5 This definition does well to outline the necessity of
involving the impacted parties, as well as to include that the goal of
the process is to amend the harms of the offense. However, Levad
argues that Zehr’s definition fails to place limits on the solutions that
arise from restorative justice processes. She notes that these
processes can result in wholly retributive outcomes and that any
definition of restorative justice should place limits on the outcomes
as much as on the processes. In place of Zehr’s definition, Levad
adopts the definition set out by Gordon Bazemore and Lode
Walgrave: “every action that is primarily oriented to doing justice by
repairing the harm that has been caused by a crime.”6 This definition,
however, is problematic due to its broadness and does little to
address the difficulties with defining restorative justice which she
outlines and are listed above. Though her criticism is correct, she
accepts an alternative definition that allows for too much
interpretation.
4 Amy Levad, Restorative Justice: Theories and Practices of Moral Imagination (El Paso:
LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC, 2012), 101.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., 102.

Undergraduate Transitional Justice Review, Vol.4, Iss.1, 2013, 2-18

https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/undergradtjr/vol4/iss1/2

4

Hunsberger: Restorative Justice in Theory

Adam Hunsberger 6

The United Nations’ (UN) Office on Drugs and Crime offers
a much more encompassing definition in its publication “Handbook
on Restorative Justice Programmes”: “Restorative justice is an
approach to problem solving that, in its various forms, involves the
victim, the offender, their social networks, justice agencies and the
community.”7 Further,
Restorative justice refers to a process for resolving crime by
focusing on redressing the harm done to the victims, holding
offenders accountable for their actions and, often also,
engaging the community in the resolution of that conflict.
Participation of the parties is an essential part of the process
that emphasizes relationship building, reconciliation and the
development of agreements around a desired outcome
between victims and offender.8
This definition is more appropriate than those mentioned above
because of its specification of the parties involved and its
requirement that both the processes and the outcomes be reflective
of the values of restorative justice. That the outcomes must focus on
“redressing the harm done” effectively filters out retributive and
rehabilitative programs that, as Levad writes, “instead follow the
normative guides of balancing the scales of justice or treating the
illness of offenders.”9 Furthermore, this definition aligns with the
three principles most common to the literature surrounding
restorative justice, outlined by Daniel Van Ness and Karen Heetderks
Strong:
1) Justice requires that we work to restore those who have
been injured: victims, communities, and even offenders; 2)
those most directly involved and affected by crime – victims,
offenders, and community – should have the opportunity to
participate as fully in the response as they wish; and 3) while
7

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Handbook on Restorative Justice
Programmes, Criminal Justice Handbook Series (New York: United Nations, 2006), 6.
8 Ibid.
9 Levad, Restorative Justice, 105.
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the government is responsible for preserving a just public
order, the community’s role in establishing and maintaining a
just peace must be given special significance.10
Because of its detail and agreement with the values, to be discussed in
the following section, and principles of restorative justice, it is the
UN definition of restorative justice that is utilized in this essay.
At this juncture, having determined an appropriate definition
upon which to base the present discussion, it is important that we
reach beyond a basic description of the core aspects of restorative
justice and explore the values upon which it is based. Participation,
respect, community empowerment, flexibility and responsiveness of
processes and outcomes, and commitment to the agreed upon
solution are all values inherent to models of restorative justice.
Central to restorative justice is the idea that people can be
empowered through participation. Victims, offenders, and the
community affected by their interaction should all contribute to the
process of restoring harmony following an offense. Proponents of
restorative justice argue that, by involving all of those affected by a
given offense in the resolution process, the individuals most affected
can adopt the most appropriate and mutually accepted and beneficial
means of conflict resolution.11 Respect, too, is essential. It is
important that any restorative justice process seek to reestablish the
humanity of all those involved. Indeed, the recognition of each
person’s inherent value, as a human being and a member of a given
community, justifies the application of restorative justice processes—
which aim to involve all those affected by the offence to determine a
mutually agreeable solution to the problem. It is also important that
these solutions maintain a level of flexibility so that unforeseen
complications or setbacks can be addressed without hindrance or
protest. Restorative processes, therefore, are by their very nature
contingent. Lastly, those involved in these processes must commit to
the agreed upon solution. In theory, if all affected parties are involved
10
11

Ibid., 106.
United Nations, Handbook, 8.
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in determining a method of resolution, each will have an increased
interest in seeing that the resolution succeeds. This value also ensures
that all parties are, and feel as if they are, being fairly treated, and
their views adequately considered. These values require that the needs
of those involved are considered and that their roles in the process
are ensured.12
There are a number of restorative justice initiatives that will
be mentioned throughout this essay. I give them brief mention here,
but they will be described in greater detail as they are mentioned in
the forthcoming analysis. Restorative justice initiatives include:
victim-offender mediation, community and family group conferences,
sentencing circles, peacemaking circles, restorative cautioning,
regulatory restorative justice, reparative probation and community
boards and panels, and truth and reconciliation commissions.13
It is important to note that theories of restorative justice are
heavily impacted by their cultural roots. Restorative forms of justice
have long existed within indigenous cultures and continue to be
practiced within indigenous communities today. Jane DicksonGilmore and Carol La Prairie write that restorative justice has been
adopted and maintained by indigenous communities as a result of the
conscious effort to oppose mainstream retributive justice.14 In its
early conceptions, restorative justice was focused on increasing the
level of participation in the judicial process. The aim of those who
adopted restorative justice, it seems, was to move criminal justice
away from “its hierarchical, adjudicative focus to a more balanced,
participatory focus on resolving conflicts and restoring
relationships.”15 Aboriginal communities developed independent
12

Ibid., 8-9.
Andrew Ashworth, “Is Restorative Justice the Way Forward for Criminal
Justice?” in Restorative Justice: Critical Issues, edited by Eugene McLaughlin, Ross
Fergusson, Gordon Hughes, and Louise Westmarland (London: Sage Publications,
2003), 165-166; and The United Nations, Handbook, 14-15.
14 Jane Dickson-Gilmore and Carol La Prairie, Will the Circle be Unbroken? Aboriginal
Communities, Restorative Justice, and the Challenges of Conflict and Change (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2005), 91.
15 Ibid.
13
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restorative justice processes in order to reassert their independence
and limit the effects on their communities of racially and culturally
biased laws. Though these initiatives have been heavily influenced by
the retributive systems with which they compete, their persistence
and success as institutions are a testament to the viability of
restorative justice initiatives.
The most well-known restorative practices utilized by First
Nations communities in Canada are the healing circle and the
sentencing circle. In both, all participants sit in a circle and discuss
the offense in order to determine an amicable means to redress
harms done. These circles are a place for taking responsibility and for
reestablishing order to relationships.16 The importance of the circle
for these communities goes beyond practical necessity. The circle has
cultural significance that aligns with the values of restorative justice.
Jane Dickson-Gilmore and Carol La Prairie elaborate:
The circle has long been viewed as a symbol of importance
and empowerment among many First Nations…As informed
by the circle, these [restorative] initiatives assert the power of
its central attributes, namely, balance, equality, and a holistic
approach to life…Within the circle…inequalities are broken
down, as is the common reticence that impedes the sharing of
information about conflict.17
The introduction of indigenous culture to the judicial process serves
the added function of restoring the community’s confidence in the
judicial process, as well as empowering these communities to commit
to a collective effort to maintain harmony.
Moving toward a discussion of restorative justice in theory as
it has developed in recent decades, it is perhaps best to begin, as do
Eugene Mcglaughlin et al. and Andrew Woolford in their respective
publications, with the work of Norwegian criminologist Nils Christie.
Christie, in his 1977 paper, “Conflicts as Property,” argues that
conflict, of which crime is a form, exists as a valuable resource that
16
17

Ibid., 132.
Ibid., 131.
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can belong to someone, be sold to others, and be stolen.18 Christie
argues that governments, he wrote of Scandinavian countries but his
analysis applies to any government that controls the means of justice,
have taken this resource from the communities in which crimes
occur. By taking over the mechanisms for prosecution and
conceptualizing crimes as having been committed against the state,
making the state the victim rather than the individual or community,
the community from which they are taken suffers a great loss.19
These communities are no longer forced to confront their
shortcomings and, therefore, are not given the opportunity to redress
them. To remedy this, Christie suggests that the power to resolve
harms done through criminal acts should be returned to the
communities in which they occur.20 This can be accomplished, he
writes, by establishing victim-oriented and community-based courts
that would offer community members greater input into the judicial
process.21
Restorative justice theory advanced in the late 1980s and early
1990s through the separate works of Howard Zehr and John
Braithwaite. Both argued for a paradigm shift from the current
retributive forms of justice present to Western societies. Zehr viewed
restorative justice as the opposite of retributive justice, although his
perspective on this particular method of framing restorative justice
has since changed. Consequently, a theory of restorative justice
developed that was based on what it was not—namely, retributive
justice—rather than what it was.22 Andrew Woolford writes that this
had the additional effect of characterizing restorative justice as a
reactive model of justice.23
18

Andrew Woolford, The Politics of Restorative Justice: A Critical Introduction (Halifax
and Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing, 2009), 48.
19 Nils Christie, “Conflict as Property,” in Restorative Justice: Critical Issues, Eugene
McLaughlin, Ross Fergusson, Gordon Hughes, and Louise Westmarland, ed.
(London: Sage Publications, 2003), 25-26.
20 Ibid., 27-28.
21 Woolford, The Politics of Restorative Justice, 48.
22 Ibid., 50.
23 Ibid.
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Braithwaite, writing in the late 1980s, helped to insert
restorative ideals within existing criminological theory. His work
addressed the issues associated with the stigmatization and labeling
that accompanies those found guilty or accused of crimes. He
revealed that the current retributive justice system may, in fact,
further commit offenders to a criminal lifestyle.24 The prosecution
process devalued the offender as a member of society and limited his
ability to positively contribute to his community in the future. In
place of this detrimental system, Braithwaite suggested the use of
“reintegration ceremonies” that would focus condemnation on the
act rather than the actor.25 The effect of these ceremonies is that the
action is not associated with the character of the individual. The
offender is able to face the shame of his actions and to move on
from that shame with a full understanding of how his actions harmed
others. Commenting on Braithwaite’s work, Dickinson-Gilmore and
La Prairie write that stigmatization is harmful as it is accompanied by
social exclusion, while shame is accompanied by social reintegration.
Braithwaite’s work, like Zehr’s, contributed to the further
development of a restorative justice theory, as well as restorative
justice processes, by demonstrating its worth as a remedy to the
shortcomings of retributive justice.
Braithwaite and Philip Petit furthered this theory by outlining
the roles of the state and local communities in a restorative system.
They write that the state is responsible for maintaining the political
space needed in order for community-based courts to operate, while
simultaneously ensuring that the legal rights of participants are not
being violated. The state, then, would have the ability to intervene
wherever community-based courts violated the rights of
participants.26 This was labeled by its authors as the republican theory
of restorative justice because, as Lode Walgrave writes, the theory
"synthesizes the legal institutional dimension (the objective rights and
freedoms that are legally defined) and the informal relational
24

Ibid.
Ibid.
26 Ibid., 53.
25
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dimension (the subjective assurance that others will respect these
rights and freedoms).”27
Furthermore, Albert Dzur and Susan Olsen argue that
theories of restorative justice should be linked with theories of direct
democracy. Theories of direct democracy encourage the participation
of any and all individuals in the political decision-making process.
This means involving each individual in the debate over a given
proposal, as well as in the ultimate decision whether to adopt said
proposal. Dzur and Olsen encourage proponents of restorative
justice to increase the communicative potential of restorative justice
by adopting the values of direct democracy: open and fair
participation.28
These early works led Heather Strang and Braithwaite to
identify two different conceptions of restorative justice: a process
conception, and a values conception. The process conception views
restorative justice as a process that brings together all of the relevant
stakeholders, those affected by some harm, to resolve conflict in a
mutually agreeable fashion.29 In the second view, the values
conception, restorative justice is contrasted with retributive justice.
Restorative justice values healing over punishment and therefore
rejects punitive measures. Perhaps it is best to utilize the example
given by the authors to reveal the difference between the two
conceptions:
Someone…committed to a process definition might say that
while a family group conference is a restorative justice
process, a mediation between a single victim and a single
offender is not – because in the latter there is no circle that
includes
or
even
invites
all
stakeholders…Someone…committed to a values conception
of restorative justice might say that a community conference
that sits in a circle and then decides to cane or incarcerate a
27

Lode Walgrave, Restorative Justice, Self-interest and Responsible Citizenship
(Cullompton: Willan, 2008), 140.
28 Ibid., 53-54.
29 Heather Strang and John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Civil Society
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1.
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child…is not restorative justice. In contrast, victim-offender
mediation satisfies the values definition of restorative
justice.30
Strang and Braithwaite, however, encourage proponents of
restorative justice to adopt both restorative processes and restorative
values for a more encompassing and, necessarily, contingent
development of restorative justice practices.31 The wholesale
exclusion of punitive measures from restorative processes is as
undesirable as the violation of privacy for the sake of ensuring
maximum participation. Each case brought before a restorative court
will require a certain amount of improvisation of the restorative
processes.
The scholarly works mentioned above are the early major
contributors to the development of restorative justice theory. They
have theorized the principles upon which restorative justice is built,
adopting practices and principles of justice present in indigenous
cultures and applying them as remedies to the shortcomings of
modern retributive justice systems.
Though restorative justice has emerged as a capable
alternative to retributive justice models in many contexts, it is not
immune to criticism. Andrew Ashworth offers a human-rights-based
critique of restorative justice’s ability to replace retributive forms of
justice in criminal matters.32 The essence of his argument is that
restorative justice models violate three principles of international
human rights law: “the principle of independence and impartiality,
the principle of proportionality, and the principle of compensation
for wrongs.”33
First, Ashworth argues that international laws, such as that
outlined in Article 6.1 of the European Convention on Human
Rights, guarantee any offender the right to a fair hearing by an
30

Ibid., 2.
Ibid.
32 Andrew Ashworth, “Restorative Justice: the Way forward for Criminal Justice?”
164-181.
33 Ibid., 171.
31
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independent and impartial tribunal.34 He states that the involvement
of the victim in the restorative judicial process undermines the
independence of the tribunal, and is therefore a violation of
international human rights law.35 Proponents of restorative justice
confront this criticism by calling into question the value of
impartiality and objectivity. Many argue that the e objectivity and
impartiality that result, in practice, in a retributive system are much
too impersonal. This, however, does little to undermine the criticism
as it is an argument against the value of retributive justice rather than
an argument for restorative justice—a recurring theme in arguments
offered by proponents of restorative justice.
There are cases, however, where impartiality and
independence are difficult to establish. For example, in the aftermath
of a civil war in which atrocities were committed by both sides, and
in which neither side emerged as victorious, impartiality will be
difficult to establish in the prosecution of any individual for
committing atrocities. In this context, it may be useful to adopt
restorative justice processes to redress the harms done by these
individuals and aid in reconciliation, even if these individuals will not
be punished as a result of these processes. Such an argument has
been offered by Joanna R. Quinn. Focusing on the use of truth
commissions as a restorative justice initiative, Quinn writes that truth
commissions are able to foster aspects of reconciliation. To clarify,
according to Quinn, a truth commission is an initiative which
“provides a forum in which a society can learn about the abuses of
the past.”36 Moreover, a truth commission adopts the primary task of
collecting “information about such abuses and to compile this
information to produce a coherent account of the history of that
society.”37 Therefore, in circumstances where the desire or ability to
prosecute perpetrators is lacking, restorative justice initiatives such as
34

Ibid.
Ibid., 172.
36 Joanna R. Quinn, “Are Truth Commissions Useful in Promoting Restorative
Justice?” in Crosscurrents: International Relations, 4th ed., ed. Mark Charlton (Toronto:
Nelson Canada, 2005), 404.
37 Ibid.
35
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the truth commission can reconcile individuals and communities
within society that have been factionalized by the conflict.
Restorative initiatives can provide a means to reconciliation in
contexts where impartiality and independence of tribunals can not be
guaranteed.
The second rights-based criticism leveled against restorative
justice concerns proportionality of outcomes. Ashworth argues that
the proportionality of outcomes is contingent on the individual will
of the victim. Some will be vindictive, others forgiving. Restorative
justice can not guarantee consistency in outcomes. In contrast,
retributive justice systems are better equipped to create a consistent
sentencing scheme, as courts are compelled to rely on precedent in
justifying their deliberations.38 Though this is true in many contexts,
this argument does not hold for unprecedented situations—
redressing the harms caused by Indian Residential Schools in Canada
is an example. In such situations, restorative justice initiatives prove
their worth. As Quinn notes, truth commissions can be adjusted in
order to address the needs of a given situation.39 Though she refers to
truth commissions specifically, this flexibility is reflective of the
values inherent to restorative justice theory and practice in general.
Further, this flexibility allows restorative processes to account for all
of the aspects of a given offense when determining outcomes. There
are, therefore, circumstances wherein, from a legal and judicial
perspective, restorative processes are preferable to retributive
processes.
Ashworth’s third critique concerns the principle of
compensation for wrongs. He argues that the primary concern of
victims is not the punishment of the offender, but rather that he be
compensated for harms inflicted upon him by the offender.40 By his
argument, the victim’s interest in the offender’s punishment is no
greater than any other member of the community. This criticism
neglects the required participation of community members in the
38

Ashworth, “Is Restorative Justice the Way Forward?” 172.
Quinn, “Are Truth Commissions Useful?” 405.
40 Ashworth, “Is Restorative Justice the Way Forward?” 173.
39
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restorative process. Moreover, it assumes that restorative justice is
absolutely opposed to consideration of precedent when determining
length and harshness of punishment. As is previously mentioned in
this essay, Strang and Braithwaite argue that restorative justice in
practice should not deal in absolutes, but rather be open to
consideration of any and all suggestions that may aid in the process
of redressing harms. The assertion made by Ashworth that
community members have as much an interest in the punishment of
offenders as do victims is hardly relevant as a criticism of restorative
justice because inclusion of the community’s views is an essential
aspect of restorative processes.
In the pages above, restorative justice, in theory, has been
portrayed as an alternative to retributive justice. It was demonstrated
that restorative justice has gained traction within aboriginal
communities as it is reflective of these communities’ values.
Furthermore, a human rights-based critique was leveled against
restorative justice theories. Despite these criticisms, restorative justice
maintains its worth as an alternative to retributive justice in both
mundane, meaning common criminal trials, and extreme
circumstances, referring to post-conflict resolution following
conflicts wherein large-scale atrocities have occurred. This worth has
been widely acknowledged by Western societies, as restorative forms
of justice have begun to gain prominence in juvenile justice systems
throughout Europe, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.
Australia and New Zealand, particularly, have recognized the
value of restorative justice. Their adoption of family group
conferencing in place of court processes when dealing with youths
has helped reduce the rate of recidivism in these states.41 Family
group conferencing is a process of restorative justice that involves the
offender, the victim, and their families in determining an appropriate
remedy to wrongs committed. This solution is suggested to a judge
who acts as the ultimate arbiter of justice. The most common
41 Loraine Gelsthorpe and Allison Morris, “Restorative Youth Justice: the last
Vestiges of Welfare?” in Youth Justice: Critical Readings, edited by John Muncie,
Gordon Hughes, and Eugene McLaughlin (London: Sage Publications, 2002), 244245.
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outcomes are apologies and community involvement.42 Young
offenders that claimed to have had a positive experience with
conferencing—those who took the process seriously by confronting
their past and claiming responsibility for their actions—have
overwhelmingly avoided reoffending.43
In this, and in the use of truth commissions in the aftermath
of atrocities, the value of restorative forms of justice are revealed, as
is the ability of restorative principles to be translated from theory into
practice. Restorative justice has the ability to address the
shortcomings of retributive justice and to improve the effectiveness
of the justice system as a means of restoring harmony to
communities that have experienced harm.
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